PART 3: THE TRUTH REGARDING THE STAMFORD HILL ERUV

Their argument: But the Mishnah Berurah argues that most poskim uphold asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta, so according to most poskim the mechitzos would not classify an area that includes a rabbim as a reshus hayachid.   

Our argument: First of all, the fact is the overwhelming majority of poskim maintain lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta.^[17] Second of all, the Mishnah Berurah says no such thing. The Mishnah Berurah is arguing that the majority of poskim uphold asu rabbim of a tzuras hapesach, but in a situation of mechitzos he clearly maintains lo asu rabbim.^[18]      

Their argument: But the world follows the Bais Ephraim who maintains that in a situation of three mechitzos, as opposed to pasei bira’os [an enclosure consisting of four two-sided posts of at least an amah wide in each direction forming the corners of a square], pirtzos esser is on a d’Oraysa level.

Our argument: Where do you have the chutzpah to create new chumros in the name of the Bais Ephraim. The Bais Ephraim does not make this distinction; you invented this argument in order to negate eruvin at all cost, and it illuminates your desperation.^[19] The ability to use mechitzos should have satisfied even the most stringent, but you have to find an issue even when utilizing them. 

The Bais Ephraim clearly maintains lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta even of three mechitzos as can be determined from his diagrams in the beginning of siman 26 and his explanation of the diagram at the end of the teshuvah. While there are some questions as to how he explains certain issues (see footnote for more details^[20]), this cannot change the fact that the Bais Ephraim’s second diagram clearly says otherwise.

As to pirtzos esser being on a d’Oraysa level in a situation of three mechitzos, the entire teshuvah of the Bais Ephraim demonstrates otherwise. In essence, they are arguing that only in a situation of pasei bira’os to delimit a reshus harabbim would the Bais Ephraim allow pirtzos esser. However, in a situation of omed merubeh of three mechitzos, the Bais Ephraim maintains that pirtzos esser is on a d’Oraysa level and turzas hapesachim would not suffice. This is simply hevel. In fact, the Bais Ephraim argues that the reason pasei bira’os are suitable to demarcate a reshus harabbim is, because otherwise asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta. According to these yungerleit, the Bais Ephraim’s argument should have been that pasei bira’os are needed because otherwise pirtzos esser would be on a d’Oraysa level (I realize that this is a very complicated inyan, and I hope to write about this at length in the future). It’s about time these yungerleit stop inventing new objections to our eruvin.  

Their argument: But we still want to be machmir according to every shitos yachidos.

Our argument: This is absurd. Are you machmir according to every shitos yachidos regarding any other issue? Why is it when the issue is eruvin we need to follow all shitos yachidos?

Of course, it is always possible to cite shitos yachidos to prohibit everything; however, ruling according to shitos yachidos is not the correct approach in halachah. [The Chasam Sofer writes (Yoreh De'ah 37) that if we were to collect all the shitos ha’ossrim we would not be able to eat bread or drink water.]

Even more so regarding hilchos eruvin, since all criteria have to be met for the area to be classified as a reshus harabbim, even if we were to employ a shitas yachid regarding reshus harabbim that would then disqualify the eruv based on only one criterion, the other conditions would not be met and an eruv would be permissible l’chatchilah. Consequently, to invalidate an eruv, one would have to selectively choose from disparate shitos yachidos ― which in many cases are contradictory ― and that is clearly an unjustifiable approach to halachah. The reality is that if someone learns hilchos eruvin with an open mind, he would realize that since it is almost impossible to meet all the criteria of a reshus harabbim, creating an eruv l’chatchilah is a real possibility.

Moreover, even if one would allege that according to some Achronim (and contrary to the overwhelming majority of poskim) the above fundaments would not allow an eruv, nevertheless, they would have to agree that each issue is still at the very minimum a safek. Consequentially, we are left with a sfek sfek sfeika, and we would therefore go l’kula even if the matter was a d’Oraysa. Lest one think that sfek sfeika is not utilized in these situations, one should peruse the Yeshuos Malko (O.C. siman 21); Avnei Nezer (O.C. 273:16, 279:2), and Levush Mordechai (4:4).

Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever not to include additional neighborhoods in the eruv. It is simply midas S’dom to punish the rest of the community. 

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^[17] Once the walls are omed merubeh al haparutz on three sides, nearly all Rishonim and Achronim maintain that the multitudes [rabbim] do not negate the enclosure, lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta.

The Following is a list of the majority of Rishonim who uphold lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta: 1) Tosfos, see Bais Ephraim, p. 39b and Avnei Nezer 276:2. 2) Rabeinu Chananel, see Ravyah p. 321. 3) Rambam, Mishnayos Eruvin 2:4, Yad 17:10, 17:33 . 4) Maggid Mishnah, ibid., 5) Hagaos Maimones, ibid., Basra 9. 6) Ravyah, p. 270. 7) HaEshkol, Eruvin siman 55. 8) Sefer HaBattim, Perek 13. 9) Tosfas Yshanim, Shabbos 6b. 10) Or Zarua, Eruvin 33b. 11) Mahrach Or Zarua, Piskei Eruvin, Perek 2 ois 57. 12) Ramak, as cited in Hagaos Ashri, 20b. 13) Rabeinu Chananel Ben Shmuel, Eruvin 22a. 14) Rivevan, Eruvin 22a. 15) Rid, Tosfos Eruvin 22a, Piskei 20a. 16) Ri’az, Piskei 2:1:6. 17) Sefer HaMeoros, Eruvin 17b. 18) Baal Hamaor, see Bais Ephraim p. 39b.

The following is a (partial) list of the overwhelming majority of poskim who maintain lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta: 1) Chacham Tzvi, siman 5, 37. 2) Knesset Yechezkal, siman 2:3. 3) Mayim Rabim, siman 34-36. 4) Maharit Tzahalon, siman 251. 5) Tosfos Shabbos, siman 363. 6) Chavas Daas, Nachlas Yaakov, Eruvin. 7) Pri Megadim, Rosh Yoseph, Shabbos 6b. 8) Even HaOzer, Eruvin 6b, 22a. 9) She’eilas Yaavetz, siman 7 and Mor U’Ketziyah, siman 363. 10) Keren Oreh, Eruvin 7a. 11) Noda B’Yehudah, O.C. Mahadura Tinyana, 42 and Teshuvah M’Ahavah, siman 112. 12) Gaon Yaakov, Eruvin 11a, 21a. 13) Michtam L’David, siman 1. 14) Shulchan Aruch HaRav, O.C. 363:42, 364:4 and Kuntres Achron, O.C. 345:2. 15) Tiferes Tzvi, siman 11. 16) Bais Ephraim, O.C. 26 (the Chevrah Hilchos Issurei Eruvin argue that the Bais Ephraim only maintains lo asu rabbim in a situation of shem daled mechitzos and not in a situation of three mechitzos; this is hevel, as the Bais Ephraim’s diagrams prove otherwise, and in due time, I will demonstrate the speciousness of their arguments). 17) HaEleph Lecha Shlomo, siman 181. 18) Aishel Avraham, siman 345. 19) Chai Adam, klal 71:15 and Nishmas Adam 71:9. 20) Chesed L’Avraham, siman 39. 21) Chasam Sofer, O.C. 89. 22) Maharham Shick, O.C. 171, 181. 23) Bais Shlomo, siman 43, 51. 24) Tzemach Tzedek, Shabbos 100a and Eruvin, the end of Perek 5. 25) Nefesh Chayah, siman 25. 26) Shaar HaZekeinim, p. 116b. 27) Chazon Nachum, siman 36. 28) Rabeinu Yosef M’Slutsk, siman 11. 29) Maharia HaLevi, siman 94. 30) Maharsham, 3:188, 9:18. 31) Yeshuos Malko, siman 21. 32) Sharei Tzion, siman 4. 33) Avnei Nezer, siman 268:4, 276:1, 279:2. 34) Harei B’samim, 5:73. 35) Imrei Yosher, siman 102 and Minchas Pitim, siman 364. 36) Kaf HaChaim, O.C. 364:12. 37) Divrei Malkiel, 3:10, 14. 38) Rav Chaim Berlin in Tikkun Shabbos Odessa, p. 28 and in Nishmas Chaim, siman 29. 39) Achiezer, 4:8. 40) Aruch HaShulchan, O.C. 364:1. 41) Even Yikrah, siman 58. 42) Chazon Ish, O.C. 74:10, 107:4.

^[18] There is a major misunderstanding regarding whom the Mishnah Berurah follows, the Chachamim and Rav Elazar [lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta] or Rav Yehudah [asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta] and Rav Yochanan [delasos neulos].  There are those who argue that the Biur Halachah, 364:2, is proof that the Mishnah Berurah’s opinion is in accordance with Rav Yehudah, since he argues that most poskim do not accept the Rambam who follows Rav Elazar who maintains lo asu rabbim of a tzuras hapesach on a d’Oraysa level. Hence, the Mishnah Berurah maintains that a tzuras hapesach is not sufficient to encompass a reshus harabbim on a d’Oraysa level; only delasos would be effective, as set forth be Rav Yochanan.

This is incorrect. The fact is the Mishnah Berurah in Shaar HaTziyun siman 363:94 maintains that we pasken lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta even in a situation of mechitzos b’y’dai shomayim [natural walls, whose efficacy is halachically inferior than mechitzos b’y’dai adam, man-made walls] (see also Biur Halachah, ibid., 36). It follows that the Mishnah Berurah in 363:156 argues that it is halachically sufficient if a mechitzah consisting of a tel hamislaket [a slope with an adequate halachic gradient] encompasses an entire city and does not mention that a Baal Nefesh should be stringent because there may be roads that are wider than 16 amos [hence, the Mishnah Berurah must be relying on lo asu rabbim of the tel hamislaket].

Why then does the Mishnah Berurah in the Biur Halachah, 364:2, accept Rav Yochanan who requires delasos me’d’Oraysa? Subsequent to what I argue above [that the Mishnah Berurah upholds lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta], there is no doubt that the Mishnah Berurah is only following those poskim who maintain that Rav Yochanan can also be in agreement with the Chachamim, and they would in certain situations ― such as in an area which is encompassed by tzuras hapesachim or only two mechitzos ― require delasos [actually, this is the Bais Ephraim’s and Chazon Ish’s argument, and in fact, both the Ravyah (p. 270, 276) and Eshkol (siman 64-65) quote Rav Yochanan yet pasken like the Chachamim which buttress’s the Bais Ephraim’s and Chazon Ish’s assertion]. This is further evident from the fact that the Mishnah Berurah (Biur Halachah, 364:2) only affirms that the Rif and the Rosh follow Rav Yochanan regarding delasos neulos but does not articulate that they accept Rav Yehudah l’halachah.

In short, the Mishnah Berurah maintains lo asu rabbim in accordance with the Chachamim and in a situation of three mechitzos would not require delasos even me’d’rabbanan. However, if an area is encompassed by tzuras hapesachim or only two mechitzos, he would require delasos me’d’Oraysa pursuant to Rav Yochanan [however, it should be noted that many poskim maintain that a tzuras hapesach would be sufficient me’d’Oraysa; see note 14]. This follows why the Mishnah Berurah [according to his understanding] asserted that it is only the Rambam who maintains lo asu rabbim on a d’Oraysa level even in a situation of tzuras hapesachim encompassing an area. However, many poskim who follow the Chachamim, would require delasos in accordance with Rav Yochanan, when only tzuras hapesachim are being used to encompass a reshus harabbim.

^[19] Besides the Bais Ephraim, nearly all poskim maintain that pirtzos esser [a breach of ten amos] is only proscribed me’d’rabbanan; hence, a tzuras hapesach would suffice to close the breach: 1) Mabit in Kiryat Sefer, Shabbos Perek 16. 2) Pnei Yehoshua, Shabbos 6a.  3) Markeves HaMishna, Shabbos, 14:1.  4) Pri Megadim, Mishbetzes Zahav, 363:1. 5) Bais Meir, siman 364. 6) Shulchan Aruch HaRav, O.C. 345:11. 7) Zera Emes, Eruvin 17. 8) Rabeinu Yosef M’Slutsk, O.C. 11. 9) Keren Oreh, Eruvin 19b. 10) Nefesh Chayah, Tikkun Eruvin (Barnov), p. 30. 11) Tiferes Tzvi, siman 11. 12) Tikkun Eruvin Krakow, teshuvah 1. 13) Avnei Nezer, O.C. 265:13, 265:25, 276:1, 279:3. 14) Toras Chesed, see beginning of the sefer Emek Yehoshua Achron. 15) Melamed Leho’il, siman 68. 16) Aruch HaShulchan, O.C. 362:26. 17) Chavatzelet HaSharon, O.C. 19. 18) Chazon Ish, O.C. 107:5-8 [The Chazon Ish ultimately (see the end of 112:5 in the letters) cites Rabeinu Yonasan that me’d’Oraysa there is no shiur pirtzah in a situation of shem daled mechitzos, as well as omed merubeh]. 19) Achiezer, 4:8. 20) Igros Moshe, O.C. 2:89-90. The above poskim do not make any distinction between mechitzos consisting of omed merubeh al haparutz or of pasei bira’os.

^[20] I can rebut all arguments of these yungerleit, however, these are complicated sygyos and would require many pages to disprove them in a lucid fashion. While it is beyond the scope of this article, I will refute a few of their arguments here, albeit abstrusely. I believe the following will demonstrate to those who know the inyan that either they are menuvalim breshus haTorah, or that they simply are am haratzim.     

We contend that when the Bais Ephraim in siman 27 argues that the walls of Yerushalayim were not classified as pasei bira’os since they were breached in their corners, he was affirming as well that the walls were parutz merubeh. Hence, the Bais Ephraim was positing that the situation in Yerushalayim was that both, there was no pasei bira’os and no omed merubeh al haparutz. However, these yungerleit argue that the Bais Epharaim cites Tosfos in Bava Metzia who maintains that there were only a few breaches in the mechitzos in Yerushalayim, and nevertheless it was classified as a reshus harabbim. Accordingly, this demonstrates, they argue, that the Bais Epharaim maintains that in a situation of omed merubeh al haparutz with no pasei bira’os, pirtzos esser is me’d’Oraysa. Their arguments demonstrate that they made up their mind and are not interested in the emes. Clearly the Bais Ephraim is not following Tosfos’ submission regarding Yerushalayim’s reality. The Bais Ephraim suggested that in Yerushalayim they rectified the breaches with tzuras hapesachim (which was sufficient according to the Chachamim to allow carrying for kodashim but not for Shabbos), while Tosfos clearly is not proposing that they rectified Yerushalayim with tzuras hapesachim (because Tosfos, here is following Rav Yehudah). [The Bais Ephraim is countering the Zera Emes’s argument on the Mishnah Lemelech.] Therefore, since the Bais Ephriam is not following Tosfos here, he could have posited that there was no pasei bira’os and no omed merubeh al haparutz in Yerushalayim, and hence it was classified as a reshus harabbim.

An additional proof that these yungerleit cite to buttress their argument that the Bais Epharaim maintains in a situation of omed merubeh of three mechitzos, we say that pirtzos esser is on a d’Oraysa level, is from his citing on p. 53b (siman 27) of the Ritva. The Bais Ephraim proposes that when the Ritva suggests (Eruvin 22a) that Yerushalayim was omed merubeh al haparutz (prior to its walls being breached, and thus it was a reshus hayachid), that its corners where intact as well. Hence, they argue that the Bais Ephraim must be adding that the corners where intact because he maintains that only with pasei bira’os would he allow a pirtzos esser. What they are misunderstanding is that the Bais Ephraim is only proposing that the corners where intact with the addition of omed merubeh al haparutz in Yerushalayim, was because the Ritva states that the mechitzos in Yerushalayim comprised of more than just pasei bira’os, since it had the benefit of shem daled mechitzos. Hence, the Bais Ephraim is positing that according to the Ritva Yerushalayim had the added benefit of omed merubeh al haparutz with its closed corners to form shem daled mechitzos. However, the Bais Ephraim is not suggesting that even though an area [which includes a rabbim] is enclosed by mechitzos omed merubeh al haparutz, since the mechitzos are lacking pasei bira’os [closed corners], it is classified as a reshus harabbim.

Furthermore, this entire argument of the yungerleit demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Bais Ephraim’s proof that all pirtzos are me’d’rabbanan. It is not possible that the Ritva and the Bais Ephraim derive from pasei bira’os that pirtzos esser or a pirtzah more than thirteen and one-third amos is only d’rabbanan, since only a pirtzah of thirteen and one-third amos is permitted in a situation of pasei bira’os. Following this, there is no doubt that the Ritva understood there is no size pirtzah, which negates any form of a mechitzah me’d’Oraysa. When the Ritva made his declaration (Eruvin 17b) that there is no size pirtza that would negate pasei bira’os, he chose a situation of pasei bira’os, and not of three mechitzos, because he wanted to demonstrate that even though pasei bira’os are parutz merubeh al haomed they are not inferior to mechitzos (since the corners are closed). Now that we recognize that pasei bira’os are not inferior, they are not negated by any size pirtzah just as we would say with mechitzos, which are omed merubeh al haparutz.

All the other proofs they cite from the Bais Ephraim (including the Avnei Nezer) demonstrates either a lack of understanding of the inayn or a purposeful misconstruing of the subject.    

PART 2: THE TRUTH REGARDING THE STAMFORD HILL ERUV

 Their argument: But the criterion of mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar is conditional only of a walled city.

Our argument: From a simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch, it is apparent that the criterion of mefulash m’shaar l’shaar is conditional of a walled marketplace and not a walled city. Hence, the gateway that the Shulchan Aruch is referring to is the sha’ar of the marketplace and not the sha’ar of city walls. Consequently, there is no doubt that the Shulchan Aruch maintains that the criterion of mefulash is never conditional of city walls. Even more so, regarding our mavo’os/roads,^[9] irrespective if the city is walled or not, it would need to fulfil the criterion of mefulash m’shaar l’shaar to be classified as a reshus harabbim.^[10]

The Mishnah Berurah (364:8), when describing the cities of his times, stated that there were streets that were sixteen amos wide and mefulash u’mechuvanim m’shaar l’shaar. Therefore, a Baal Nefesh should be stringent since in order to erect an eruv in these cities, they would have needed to rely on the fact that the street did not have shishim ribo traversing it. As we know that most towns in his times were not walled, we can deduce that he accepted the criterion of mefulash u’mechuvanim as not being dependent on a walled city.

The Divrei Malkiel (4:3) states that to find a street in a large city which is mefulash, open from one end of the city to the other, is unheard of, and that is why the minhag is to erect eruvin even in the largest of cities. He wrote this teshuvah regarding Odessa, a city that was not walled.

Rav Shlomo Dovid Kahane zt”l (Divrei Menachem, O.C. vol. 2, pp. 42-43), one of the main rabbanim of Warsaw before World War II, posited that the heter to erect an eruv in a large city such as Warsaw, which was unwalled from the year 1877 (Encyklopedia Warszawy, 1994 p. 187), was universally accepted as the streets were not mefulashim u’mechuvanim m’shaar l’shaar. More so, he claimed, a small city would have a greater issue establishing an eruv since its streets would be mefulash. In a small city, there is usually one main street running straight through the center of the town, as opposed to a large city where the streets are generally not straight from city gate to city gate. [See footnote for an additional list of poskim.^[11]]

Hence, the Shulchan Aruch, and the overwhelming majority of poskim uphold that the criterion of mefulash m’shaar l’shaar as it pertains to city roads is not conditional of a city encompassed by walls.^[12]

Their argument: But we do not maintain that mefulash necessarily infers that a road needs to be aligned from gateway to gateway.    

Our argument: The Magen Avraham (345:6; based on the Bais Yoseph) and most poskim^[13]  assert that mefulash m’shaar l’shaar infers mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar, meaning the marketplace is aligned from gateway to gateway.^[14]

Their argument: But, shouldn’t we be machmir, even according to one posek.

Our argument: So, in conclusion of our debate regarding your opposition to our reliance on the criterion of mefulash u’mechavanim, you are arguing that we need to follow shitos yachidos. We do not need to agree with your chumros. However, even if we are machmir, once we erect tzuras hapesachim the majority of poskim maintain that it would reclassify me’d’Oraysa a reshus harabbim as a reshus hayachid.^[15] Accordingly, since the requirement of delasos is me’d’rabbanan, we can be lenient [safek d’rabbanan l’kulla] and apply any additional heter to remove the obligation of delasos.^[16] Hence, even if one would be machmir, once tzuras hapesachim are established no doubt me’d’rabbanan one can rely on the above criteria.  

Their argument: But we still want to be machmir, according to even one posek.

Our argument: So, in conclusion of this argument, you are opposing our reliance on the fact that many poskim maintain that a tzuras hapesach would reclassify me’d’Oraysa a reshus harabbim as a reshus hayachid, because you are arguing that we need to follow shitos yachidos. We do not need to agree with your chumros. However, if you still want to be machmir we have mechitzos to rely on, in which case the area would be designated as a reshus hayachid.

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^[9] According to the overwhelming majority of poskim, in order to classify mavaos as a reshus harabbim it would need to fulfill the criterion of mefulash m’shaar l’shaar even if the road is not lined with any walls. However, an argument can be made that a platya would only need to fulfill the criterion of mefulash m’shaar l’shaar if it would be lined with (at the minimum) two walls.

^[10] It is patently clear from the Rishonim [since they argue that Yerushalayim was open upon its length and width, and was mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar, Ritva, Eruvin 22a; Or Zarua, Hilchos Eruvin siman 129, and Meiri, Eruvin 6a, 20a], that only the entryways to the commencement and conclusion of the mavo’os/roads are categorized as the gateways [she’arim], and the intersecting roads do not establish additional gateways to the street [e.g. it is not sufficient that each segment of a street between intersections is mefulash]. Hence, the criterion of mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar is conditional on the road being literally straight from end to end through the city limits.

^[11] The following is a list of some additional poskim who maintain that mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar, is not conditional of a city encompassed by walls: Mayim Rabim (siman 38, p. 39b; in regards to sratyas and mavo’os hamefulashim); Pri Megadim (Aishel Avraham, 364:2, Mishbetzes Zahav, 363:18); Bais Meir (siman 363:29); Bais Ephraim (siman 26 44b; in regards to sratyas and mavo’os hamefulashim); Tzemach Tzedek (Shabbos 6a; in regards to sratyas and mavo’os hamefulashim); Mahari Asad (siman 54); Shoel U'Maishiv (1:2:87); U'Bacharta B'Chaim (siman 117), and Maharsham (3:188).

Furthermore, we can add the following, the Magen Avraham (345:6; based on the Bais Yoseph) and most poskim (Olas Shabbos, Tosfos Shabbos, Elya Rabbah, Pri Megadim, Shulchan Aruch Harav, Mishnah Berurah, and Aruch Hashulchan) assert that mefulash m’shaar l’shaar infers mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar, meaning runs straight from gateway to gateway. Therefore, since all Rishonim (and Achronim) maintain that mefulash is a fundament of a reshus harabbim, even in a city that is not walled (e.g. Rashi, Eruvin, 59a; Ravyah, Eruvin, siman 379; Rokeach, siman 175; Rid, Piskei, Sukkah 43a, and the majority of Rishonim who mention the criterion of mefulash without the qualifier of city walls), and the Gedolei HaPoskim uphold that, mefulash infers mechavanim, hence all city streets would need to be mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar to be classified as a reshus harabbim, irrespective if the city is walled or not.

^[12] While Rav Aharon Kotler zt”l and Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l maintain that the criterion of mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar is conditional only of a walled city, as we just demonstrated, they are in fact disagreeing with the overwhelming majority of the Gedolei Haposkim, hence, one cannot require the world to follow their chiddushim.

^[13] Besides the Magen Avraham the list includes: Olas Shabbos, 345:6; Tosfos Shabbos, 345:13; Elya Rabbah, 345:13; Prei Megadim, Aishel Avraham, 345:6; Shulchan Aruch Harav, 345:11; Mishnah Berurah, 345:20, and Aruch Hashulchan, 345:15.

^[14] No one of stature argues that the criterion of mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar does not imply precisely aligned from end to end. The Meiri clearly states (Eruvin 6a) that the fundament of mefulash u’mechavanim is understood as precisely aligned from end to end. There is no other definition of mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar but precisely straight from end to end. [In fact, even those few poskim who maintain that the criterion of mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar is conditional of a walled city never argue that mechavanim does not imply precisely aligned from end to end.]  

^[15] See Korban Nesanel (Succos 1:34:1); Pri Megadim (Rosh Yosef, Shabbos 6b); Shulchan Aruch HaRav (O.C. 364:4); Gaon Yaakov (Eruvin 11a); Rav Chaim of Volozhin (Otzar Reb Chaim Berlin, Shu"t Nishmas Chaim, p. 1); Tzemach Tzedek (Eruvin the end of Perek 5); Aishel Avraham (siman 345); Yeshuos Malko (O.C. 21); Avnei Nezer (O.C. 273:16, 279:2, 289:2); Aruch HaShulchan (O.C. 364:1); Livush Mordechai (4:4); Bais Av (2:9:3), and Kaf HaChaim (O.C. 364:12).

While the Bais Ephraim and the Chazon Ish maintain that a tzuras hapesach would not suffice on a d’Oraysa level, they uphold that in order to negate a tzuras hapesach we require shishim ribo to traverse therein (see Bais Ephraim, siman 26, p. 49b, and Chazon Ish, O.C. 108:12). Consequently, since most eruvin do not have shishim ribo traversing through the tzuras hapesachim, there would be no requirement of delasos (even me’d’rabbanan). [Moreover, the Bais Ephraim at the conclusion of his teshuvah (siman 26) clearly maintains that we should erect tzuras hapesachim, and to then obstruct an eruv using the argument that he would oppose the use of tzuras hapesachim is a perversion of his opinion.]

^[16] Avnei Nezer (O.C. siman 273:16, 279:2, 289:2); Kanah V’Kanamon (5:56); Livush Mordechai (4:4), and Bais Av (2:9:3).

PART 1: THE TRUTH REGARDING THE STAMFORD HILL ERUV

 

Introduction

Well, it happened: Kedassia, after being dragged kicking and screaming to support an eruv for the Tottenham neighborhood, allowed the yungerleit to take over the show. These yungerleit in kovetz Peolim LaTorah conjured up an excuse why only the Tottenham Eruv would be allowed, but chas v’shalom to expand it any further. This is a real tragedy. You see, dear readers, you should not have been naïve, thinking that once you establish an eruv for part of a neighborhood Kedassia would allow you to expand the eruv. To those who learnt the inyan, the article in Peolim LaTorah screams let us collect all chumros in eruvin in order to obstruct and prohibit the expansion of as many eruvin as possible.^[1]

The fact that the cabal dives right into the issue of mechitzos without clarifying why any of these areas in London would be classified initially as a reshus harabbim, demonstrates their bias. Why didn’t the yungerleit from the get go clarify how these areas fulfil the criteria of reshus harabbim, such as mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar and shishim ribo? The answer is that they are afraid to lay out their feeble arguments in their entirety. They purposefully picked the most complex part of hilchos eruvin, mechitzos, where they can easily distort the inyan, and the average person could not mount a rebuttal.  

In order to illuminate the paucity of the arguments opposing a larger eruv, let us do so in a point counterpoint argument style: 

As an hakdamah let us start with the text of the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 345:7):

There are four defining conditions of what constitutes a reshus harabbim: rechovos or shevakim^[2] [marketplaces/platyas] that are at least sixteen amos wide, that is not roofed [mikorim], that is open and aligned from gateway to gateway [mefulash m’shaar l’shaar], and has 600,000 people traversing it daily [shishim ribo (sixty myriads) ovrim bo b’chol yom].

As most public roads are more than sixteen amos wide and not roofed, most citywide eruvin would be predicated on two criteria: Mefulash u’mechavanim and shishim ribo.

Our argument: The entire area is not classified as a reshus harabbim, because, it does not fulfil the criterion of shishim ribo.

Their argument: As per the Mishnah Berurah’s argument that most Rishonim do not uphold the criterion of shishim ribo l’chatchilah, we do not want to rely on this criterion.

Our argument: The Bais Ephraim does uphold shishim ribo, l’chatchilah, and so do the overwhelming majority of poskim. The Mishnah Berurah did not see the Bais Ephraim’s list of Rishonim.^[3] In fact, we can add to the Bais Ephraim’s tally of Rishonim, since we know today of many more Rishonim who accepted the criterion of shishim ribo [more than seventy accept the criterion and thirteen clearly do not^[4]]. Hence, either we accept the fundament because this is the minhag or because the overwhelming majority of Rishonim [and all of those from Tzorfas and Ashkenaz, and at least four Gaonim], and the Rema uphold the criterion l’chatchilah.^[5]

Their argument: Alright, but the criterion is conditional of a city not the street. London’s population is much greater than shishim ribo, hence it would be classified as a reshus harabbim.

Our argument: No posek of stature maintains that the criterion is conditional of a city.^[6]

It was the mesorah through the ages that the criterion of shishim ribo is dependent on a single marketplace/street. The Divrei Malkiel (4:3) stated when writing to the people erecting an eruv in the city of Odessa, which had approximately shishim ribo, that, “the minhag is to erect eruvin even in the largest of cities, and it does not concern us that they contain shishim ribo since the shishim ribo is dispersed over all its streets.”^[7]

Even Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l admitted that the simple understanding of the Shulchan Aruch is that the criterion of shishim ribo is conditional of a street and on a daily basis  as he posits that the Shulchan Aruch is referring to a sratya ⎯ and to say otherwise is a chiddush (Igros Moshe, O.C. 1:139:5). Rav Moshe added (ibid., 4:87) that since, historically, eruvin had been erected in cities with populations exceeding shishim ribo, one could not classify a city as a reshus harabbim solely on the basis of the existence of a population of 600,000.

[Rav Moshe, maintained that the criterion of shishim ribo when applied to a city required a population of three million, over a twelve mil by twelve mil area (approximately 13 by 13 km). However, just as he argued in Detroit, Michigan, he would not include the population of the city of London proper in the tally of a Stamford Hill Eruv. Moreover, there is no doubt that in an area of 13 by 13 km the population of London it is much less than three million (it is somewhere between 1.5-2 million).] 

Their argument: Fine but, the criterion of shishim ribo is not conditional on people actually traversing the road, if the road would just service shishim ribo it would be sufficient.   

Our argument: This is simply incorrect. The fact that the Shulchan Aruch uses the term shishim ribo ovrim bo, implies a thoroughfare in continuous use and not merely the presence of 600,000 people in the vicinity who would have the ability to utilize the street.

The Bais Yitzchak (Y.D. siman 136:3) responded to one who suggested that the criterion of shishim ribo is not conditional on people actually traversing the road, whose mere presence in the area would be sufficient, “[that] this is in opposition to most poskim including Rashi and Tosfos.” The Maharsham argued (3:188), if the criterion of shishim ribo includes even those who occasional use the street, how do we apply limits on the amount of time needed to fulfill the criterion. Clearly this is not the method we use to calculate the criterion of shishim ribo.^[8]

Their argument: But, shouldn’t we be machmir according to even one posek?

Our argument: So, in conclusion of our debate regarding your opposition to our reliance on the criterion of shishim ribo, you are arguing that we need to follow shitos yachidos. We do not need to agree with your chumros. However, even if we are machmir, there are other criteria of a reshus harabbim that these areas in London do not fulfil, such as mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar. 

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^[1] Their main argument regarding the Bais Ephraim and pasei bira’os is actually not their own, they are appropriating from other eino modeh beruvin without giving credit; see more about this issue in note 20. 

^[2] The Shulchan Aruch in 345:7, uses the words rechovos and shevakim, which according to most poskim are just alternative labels for marketplaces (see Metzudos Tzion, Shir Hashirim 3:2; Mayim Rabim, siman 38, and Bais Ephraim, siman 26 p. 44b). The Magen Avraham indicates on the word rechovos that sratyas are included in these halachos set forth by the Shulchan Aruch. In 345:8-9 the Shulchan Aruch deals with mavo’os hamefulashim.  

[3] The poskim have already called attention to the fact that the Mishnah Berurah had obviously not seen the Bais Ephraim (Toldos Shmuel, 3:81:7, 3:86:8; Bais Av, 2:5:2; Divrei Yatziv, 2:173:1, and Even Yisroel, 8:36). We can add that this is evident from the Mishnah Berurah himself since he states that he did not possess the sefer Bais Ephraim (Bi’ur Halachah, 208:9, s.v. Eino M’Vorech). The poskim postulate that had the Mishnah Berurah seen the Bais Ephraim he would have paskened like him that shishim ribo is an accepted fundament of a reshus harabbim, and he would have agreed that even a Baal Nefesh could be lenient and rely on the fact that the streets are lacking shishim ribo.

^[4] This is a preliminary list; I will eventually publish a complete list with over seventy Geonim and Rishonim who uphold the criterion and thirteen who do not.

Gaonim - 1) Bahag, Berlin edition, p. 131. 2) Rav Amram Gaon, Halachos Pesukos Min HaGaonim, siman 70. 3) Sar Shalom Gaon, Chemdah Genuzah, siman 70 and Sharei Teshuvah, siman 209 (see also Sefer Ha’itim, ois 92). 4) The Gaon mentioned in the Sefer Ha’itim, ois 206.

Rishonim - 5) Rashi, Eruvin 6a, 6b, 26a, 59a, 47a. 6) Baalei HaTosfos, Eruvin 6a, 26a, 59a, and Shabbos 6b, 64b. 7) Sefer Ha’itim, ois 92, 206, 209. 8) Rabeinu Shmuel, Or Zarua, ois 164. 9) Machzor Vitri, Perek B'mah Isha, ois 31, 32. 10) Ra’avan, Shabbos 349. 11) HaEshkol, Hilchos Tzitzis ois 31. 12) Ha’itur, Hilchos Tzitzis, Shaar 3 Shaar Adom Chelek 1. 13) Ravyah, Hilchos Eruvin 379, 391. 14) HaManhig, Hilchos Shabbos HaTzarichos ois 138. 15) Rokeach, Hilchos Shabbos 175. 16) Sefer HaNer, Eruvin 6a, 59a. 17) Sefer HaTrumah, ois 214, 239. 18) Or Zarua, Hilchos Shabbos siman 16, Eruvin 129. 19) Rid, Piskei Eruvin 6a, 59a, Tosfos Pesachim 69a and Teshuvos, siman 107. 20) MaHrach Or Zarua, Piskei Eruvin Perek 2 ois 57. 21) Rivevan, Eruvin 6b, 59a. 22) Semag, Hilchos Shabbos p. 17. 23) Maharam MeRotenberg, siman 31, Eruvin ois 9, 10. 24) RaaH, Ran (Hamyuchos), Shabbos 6b. 25) Riaz, Eruvin Perek 1:5, 5:5. 26) Talmid HaRashba, Chiddushei Eruvin, 2a, 59b. 27) Mordechai, Shabbos 64b, 100a. 28) Smak, Mitzvos Hatluyos B’Shabbos p. 296, 299. 29) Hagahos Maimonios, Eruvin Perek 5:2, 5:4.  30) Rosh, Beitzah 24a, Eruvin 6a (see also Kitzur Piskei HaRosh, Perek 1:8). 31) Tur, O.C. 345, 364, 392. 32) Ramak, Piskei (Rabeinu Mendel Kloizner) Shabbos 6a, Hagahos Ashri, Eruvin 6b, 20b. 33) Rabeinu Yerucham, Toldos Adom V’Chavah 12:4, 12:17. 34) Orchos Chaim, Hilchos Shabbos ois 284. 35) HaAgudah, Perek 5:56. 36) Tsedah LaDerech, Perek 42, 46. 37) Sefer HaNeyar, Hilchos Eruvin p. 51. 38) Hagahos Ashri, Eruvin 6b, 20b. 39) Nimukei Yosef, Hilchos Tzitzis. 40) HaAgur, siman 537.

The following is a list of Rishonim who oppose the criterion of shishim ribo:

1) Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 14:1. 2) Hashlama, Eruvin 6a. 3) Ramban, Shabbos, 57a, and Eruvin 59a. 4) Sefer HaMeoros, Eruvin 6a. 5) Rashba, Teshuvos HaRashba siman 722. 6) Hagahos Mordechai, Shabbos Perek 6. 7) Ritva, 59a. 8) Magid Mishnah, Shabbos 14:1. 9) Meiri, Bais HaBechirah Shabbos 57a, and Eruvin 6b, and Chidushim Eruvin 6b. 10) Ran, Shabbos Perek 6, Chidushim Eruvin 6a. 11) Rivash, siman 405. [Rabeinu Tam, Rashbam, and Yereim on the Mishkenos Yaakov’s/Mishnah Berurah’s list of those opposing the criterion are debatable and today can be listed with those who maintain that shishim ribo is a criterion of a reshus harabbim (at least regarding Rabeinu Tam and the Rashbam).]

^[5] While the Bais Meir questions (as cited in the Biur Halachah, 345:7) what the Rema’s opinion is, the Bais Ephraim (and even the Mishkenos Yaakov) and all the other poskim cite additional proof that the Rema does uphold the criterion of shishim ribo.  

^[6] Some argue that from the Achiezer it is evident that he maintains that the criterion of shishim ribo is conditional of a city. However, they are simply incorrect.      

This is what the Achiezer writes: Paris is definitely a reshus ha’rabbim me’d’Oraysa since it contains shishim ribo traversing therein even though not every thoroughfare includes shishim ribo, just as Yerushalayim and Mechuzah did not have shishim ribo traversing all of their roads. A close reading reveals that the Achiezer necessitates at least some thoroughfares that would need to fulfil the requirement of shishim ribo traversing it, and only then would the connecting roads of the entire city be classified as a reshus harabbim. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Achiezer’s position regarding shishim ribo is conditional of a city and not a road since at least some thoroughfares would be required to have shishim ribo traversing it.

^[7] These are some of the additional poskim who clearly maintain that shishim ribo is dependent on the street: Levush (345:7); Perishah (O.C. 325:8); Pnei Yehoshua (Shabbos 5b); Sedei Haaretz (Y.D. p. 29:3); Zera Emes (3:34); Bais Meir (Shabbos 5b); Bais Yaakov (Eruvin 6a); Yad Dovid (Eruvin 55a); Shulchan Aruch HaRav (363:44); Bais Ephraim (p. 46); Mishkenos Yaakov (p. 126); Chiddushi Harim (siman 4); Yeshuos Malko (siman 27); Mishnah Berurah (Shaar HaTzion, 345:25) [the Mishnah Berurah indicates this by the usage of the phrase, “derech hamavoi hamefulash,” ― it is important to note, the Mishnah Berurah’s (345:24) primary issue is whether the shishim ribo are required to traverse the street every day of the year or whether occasional use of the street by 600,000 people would be sufficient, see also Toldos Shmuel, 3:86:10]; Minchas Elazar (3:4); Bais Av (2:5:2); Maharshag (2:25); Chazon Ish (107:6); Mahari Stief (siman 68); V’yaan Yoseph (131:1, 155:1, 195:2); Divrei Yatziv (173:4); Rav Shmuel Wosner zt”l (in Shevet HaLevi, 6:41); Rav Yechezkel Roth zt”l (in Emek HaTeshuvah 5:19), and see also the shaila to the Chacham Tzvi in siman 37.

^[8] Besides for the above mentioned Bais Yitzchak and Maharsham, the Divrei Chaim (Lekutim siman 3); Yeshuos Malko (O.C. siman 27); Sefas Emes (Shabbos, 6b); Divrei Malkiel (4:3); Bais Av (2:5:2:3), and Minchas Yitzchak (8:32), all agreed that the criterion of shishim ribo is only met when 600,000 people actually traverse the street.

Those who suggest that the Bais Ephraim’s understanding of the Ritva, that the mere presence of shishim ribo in the vicinity would classify a street as a reshus harabbim, are mistaken.  The Gedolei Haposkim (mentioned above, the Maharsham, and Minchas Yitzchak) understood the Bais Ephraim otherwise. The only question regarding the Bais Ephraim’s position was whether the requirement of shishim ribo traversing the street is every day or would on most days suffice.     

Finally, even according to this faulty argument, it is mindless to claim that the mere presence of 600,000 people in the vicinity of the street would classify it as servicing shishim ribo. If people from the vicinity rarely utilize the street, why should they ever be included in the tally?