Their argument: But the Mishnah Berurah argues that most poskim uphold asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta, so according to most poskim the mechitzos would not classify an area that includes a rabbim as a reshus hayachid.
Our argument: First of all, the fact is the
overwhelming majority of poskim maintain lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei
mechitzta.[17]
Second of all, the Mishnah Berurah says no such thing. The Mishnah
Berurah is arguing that the majority of poskim uphold asu rabbim
of a tzuras hapesach, but in a situation of mechitzos he clearly
maintains lo asu rabbim.[18]
Their argument: But the world follows the Bais
Ephraim who maintains that in a situation of three mechitzos, as
opposed to pasei bira’os [an enclosure consisting of four two-sided
posts of at least an amah wide in each direction forming the corners of a
square], pirtzos esser is on a d’Oraysa level.
Our argument: Where do you have the chutzpah to
create new chumros in the name of the Bais Ephraim. The Bais
Ephraim does not make this distinction; you invented this argument in order
to negate eruvin at all cost, and it illuminates your desperation.[19] The
ability to use mechitzos should have satisfied even the most stringent,
but you have to find an issue even when utilizing them.
The Bais Ephraim clearly maintains lo asu rabbim
u’mevatlei mechitzta even of three mechitzos as can be determined
from his diagrams in the beginning of siman 26 and his explanation of
the diagram at the end of the teshuvah. While there are some questions
as to how he explains certain issues (see footnote for more details[20]),
this cannot change the fact that the Bais Ephraim’s second diagram
clearly says otherwise.
As to pirtzos esser being on a d’Oraysa
level in a situation of three mechitzos, the entire teshuvah of
the Bais Ephraim demonstrates otherwise. In essence, they are arguing
that only in a situation of pasei bira’os to delimit a reshus
harabbim would the Bais Ephraim allow pirtzos esser. However,
in a situation of omed merubeh of three mechitzos, the Bais
Ephraim maintains that pirtzos esser is on a d’Oraysa level
and turzas hapesachim would not suffice. This is simply hevel. In
fact, the Bais Ephraim argues that the reason pasei bira’os are
suitable to demarcate a reshus harabbim is, because otherwise asu
rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta. According to these yungerleit, the Bais
Ephraim’s argument should have been that pasei bira’os are needed
because otherwise pirtzos esser would be on a d’Oraysa level (I
realize that this is a very complicated inyan, and I hope to write about
this at length in the future). It’s about time these yungerleit stop
inventing new objections to our eruvin.
Their argument: But we still want to be machmir
according to every shitos yachidos.
Our argument: This is absurd. Are you machmir
according to every shitos yachidos regarding any other issue? Why is it
when the issue is eruvin we need to follow all shitos yachidos?
Of course, it is always possible to cite shitos
yachidos to prohibit everything; however, ruling according to shitos
yachidos is not the correct approach in halachah. [The Chasam
Sofer writes (Yoreh De'ah 37) that if we were to collect all the shitos
ha’ossrim we would not be able to eat bread or drink water.]
Even more so regarding hilchos eruvin, since all
criteria have to be met for the area to be classified as a reshus harabbim,
even if we were to employ a shitas yachid regarding reshus harabbim
that would then disqualify the eruv based on only one criterion, the
other conditions would not be met and an eruv would be permissible l’chatchilah.
Consequently, to invalidate an eruv, one would have to selectively
choose from disparate shitos yachidos ― which in
many cases are contradictory ― and that is clearly an unjustifiable
approach to halachah. The reality is that if someone learns hilchos eruvin
with an open mind, he would realize that since it is almost impossible to meet
all the criteria of a reshus harabbim, creating an eruv l’chatchilah
is a real possibility.
Moreover, even if one would allege that according to some Achronim
(and contrary to the overwhelming majority of poskim) the above
fundaments would not allow an eruv, nevertheless, they would have to
agree that each issue is still at the very minimum a safek.
Consequentially, we are left with a sfek sfek sfeika, and we would
therefore go l’kula even if the matter was a d’Oraysa. Lest one
think that sfek sfeika is not utilized in these situations, one should
peruse the Yeshuos Malko (O.C. siman 21); Avnei Nezer (O.C.
273:16, 279:2), and Levush Mordechai (4:4).
Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever not to include
additional neighborhoods in the eruv. It is simply midas S’dom to
punish the rest of the community.
[17]
Once the walls
are omed merubeh al haparutz on three
sides, nearly all Rishonim and Achronim maintain that the multitudes [rabbim] do not negate the enclosure, lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta.
The Following is a list of the majority of Rishonim who uphold lo asu
rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta: 1) Tosfos,
see Bais Ephraim, p. 39b and Avnei Nezer 276:2. 2) Rabeinu Chananel, see Ravyah p. 321. 3) Rambam, Mishnayos Eruvin 2:4, Yad 17:10, 17:33 . 4) Maggid
Mishnah, ibid., 5) Hagaos Maimones,
ibid., Basra 9. 6) Ravyah, p. 270. 7) HaEshkol, Eruvin siman
55. 8) Sefer HaBattim, Perek 13. 9) Tosfas Yshanim, Shabbos
6b. 10) Or Zarua, Eruvin 33b. 11) Mahrach Or Zarua, Piskei
Eruvin, Perek 2 ois 57. 12) Ramak, as cited in Hagaos
Ashri, 20b. 13) Rabeinu Chananel Ben
Shmuel, Eruvin 22a. 14) Rivevan, Eruvin 22a. 15) Rid, Tosfos Eruvin 22a, Piskei 20a. 16) Ri’az, Piskei 2:1:6. 17) Sefer HaMeoros, Eruvin
17b. 18) Baal Hamaor, see Bais Ephraim p. 39b.
The following is a (partial) list of the overwhelming majority of poskim who maintain lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta: 1) Chacham Tzvi, siman 5,
37. 2) Knesset Yechezkal, siman 2:3. 3) Mayim Rabim, siman 34-36.
4) Maharit Tzahalon, siman 251. 5) Tosfos Shabbos, siman
363. 6) Chavas Daas, Nachlas Yaakov, Eruvin. 7) Pri Megadim, Rosh Yoseph, Shabbos 6b. 8) Even HaOzer,
Eruvin 6b, 22a. 9) She’eilas Yaavetz, siman 7 and Mor U’Ketziyah,
siman 363. 10) Keren Oreh, Eruvin 7a.
11) Noda B’Yehudah, O.C. Mahadura
Tinyana, 42 and Teshuvah M’Ahavah,
siman 112. 12) Gaon Yaakov, Eruvin 11a,
21a. 13) Michtam L’David, siman 1. 14) Shulchan Aruch HaRav, O.C.
363:42, 364:4 and Kuntres Achron, O.C. 345:2. 15) Tiferes Tzvi, siman 11.
16) Bais Ephraim, O.C. 26 (the Chevrah Hilchos Issurei Eruvin argue that the Bais Ephraim only maintains lo
asu rabbim in a situation of shem
daled mechitzos and not in a situation of three mechitzos; this is hevel,
as the Bais Ephraim’s diagrams prove
otherwise, and in due time, I will demonstrate the speciousness of their
arguments). 17) HaEleph Lecha Shlomo,
siman 181. 18) Aishel Avraham, siman
345. 19) Chai Adam, klal 71:15 and Nishmas Adam 71:9. 20) Chesed
L’Avraham, siman 39. 21) Chasam Sofer, O.C. 89. 22) Maharham Shick,
O.C. 171, 181. 23) Bais Shlomo, siman 43, 51. 24) Tzemach
Tzedek, Shabbos 100a and Eruvin, the end of Perek 5. 25) Nefesh Chayah,
siman 25. 26) Shaar HaZekeinim, p. 116b. 27) Chazon
Nachum, siman 36. 28) Rabeinu Yosef M’Slutsk, siman 11. 29) Maharia HaLevi, siman 94.
30) Maharsham, 3:188, 9:18. 31) Yeshuos Malko, siman 21. 32) Sharei Tzion,
siman 4. 33) Avnei Nezer, siman 268:4,
276:1, 279:2. 34) Harei B’samim,
5:73. 35) Imrei Yosher, siman 102 and Minchas Pitim, siman 364.
36) Kaf HaChaim, O.C. 364:12. 37) Divrei
Malkiel, 3:10, 14. 38) Rav Chaim Berlin in Tikkun Shabbos Odessa, p. 28 and in Nishmas Chaim, siman 29.
39) Achiezer, 4:8. 40) Aruch HaShulchan, O.C. 364:1. 41) Even Yikrah, siman 58. 42) Chazon Ish, O.C. 74:10,
107:4.
[18]
There is a major
misunderstanding regarding whom the Mishnah
Berurah follows, the Chachamim
and Rav Elazar [lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei
mechitzta] or Rav Yehudah [asu rabbim
u’mevatlei mechitzta] and Rav Yochanan [delasos
neulos]. There are those who argue
that the Biur Halachah, 364:2, is
proof that the Mishnah Berurah’s
opinion is in accordance with Rav Yehudah, since he argues that most poskim do not accept the Rambam who follows Rav Elazar who
maintains lo asu rabbim of a tzuras hapesach on a d’Oraysa level. Hence, the Mishnah Berurah maintains that a tzuras hapesach is not sufficient to
encompass a reshus harabbim on a d’Oraysa level; only delasos would be effective, as set forth
be Rav Yochanan.
This is incorrect. The fact is the Mishnah Berurah in Shaar
HaTziyun siman 363:94 maintains that we pasken
lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta even in a situation of mechitzos b’y’dai shomayim [natural
walls, whose efficacy is halachically inferior than mechitzos b’y’dai adam, man-made walls] (see also Biur Halachah, ibid., 36). It follows
that the Mishnah Berurah in 363:156
argues that it is halachically sufficient if a mechitzah consisting of a tel
hamislaket [a slope with an adequate halachic gradient] encompasses an
entire city and does not mention that a Baal
Nefesh should be stringent because there may be roads that are wider than
16 amos [hence, the Mishnah Berurah must be relying on lo asu rabbim of the tel hamislaket].
Why then does the Mishnah
Berurah in the Biur Halachah,
364:2, accept Rav Yochanan who requires delasos
me’d’Oraysa? Subsequent to what I argue above [that the Mishnah Berurah upholds lo asu rabbim u’mevatlei mechitzta],
there is no doubt that the Mishnah
Berurah is only following those poskim
who maintain that Rav Yochanan can also be in agreement with the Chachamim, and they would in certain
situations ― such as in an area which is
encompassed by tzuras hapesachim or
only two mechitzos ― require delasos
[actually, this is the Bais Ephraim’s
and Chazon Ish’s argument, and in
fact, both the Ravyah (p. 270, 276)
and Eshkol (siman 64-65) quote Rav Yochanan yet pasken like the Chachamim
which buttress’s the Bais Ephraim’s and
Chazon Ish’s assertion]. This is
further evident from the fact that the Mishnah
Berurah (Biur Halachah, 364:2)
only affirms that the Rif and the Rosh follow Rav Yochanan regarding delasos neulos but does not articulate
that they accept Rav Yehudah l’halachah.
In short, the Mishnah
Berurah maintains lo asu rabbim in
accordance with the Chachamim and in a situation of three mechitzos would not
require delasos even me’d’rabbanan. However, if an area is encompassed by
tzuras hapesachim or only two mechitzos, he would require delasos me’d’Oraysa
pursuant to Rav Yochanan [however, it should be noted that many poskim maintain that a tzuras hapesach would be sufficient me’d’Oraysa; see note 14]. This follows
why the Mishnah Berurah [according to
his understanding] asserted that it is only the Rambam who maintains lo asu
rabbim on a d’Oraysa level even
in a situation of tzuras hapesachim encompassing
an area. However, many poskim who follow
the Chachamim, would require delasos in accordance with Rav Yochanan, when
only tzuras hapesachim are being used
to encompass a reshus harabbim.
[19]
Besides the Bais
Ephraim, nearly all poskim maintain that pirtzos esser [a
breach of ten amos] is only proscribed me’d’rabbanan; hence, a tzuras
hapesach would suffice to close the breach: 1) Mabit in Kiryat
Sefer, Shabbos Perek 16. 2) Pnei Yehoshua, Shabbos 6a. 3) Markeves HaMishna, Shabbos,
14:1. 4) Pri Megadim, Mishbetzes
Zahav, 363:1. 5) Bais Meir, siman 364. 6) Shulchan Aruch
HaRav, O.C. 345:11. 7) Zera Emes, Eruvin 17. 8) Rabeinu
Yosef M’Slutsk, O.C. 11. 9) Keren Oreh, Eruvin 19b.
10) Nefesh Chayah, Tikkun Eruvin (Barnov), p. 30. 11) Tiferes
Tzvi, siman 11. 12) Tikkun Eruvin Krakow, teshuvah 1.
13) Avnei Nezer, O.C. 265:13, 265:25, 276:1, 279:3. 14) Toras
Chesed, see beginning of the sefer Emek Yehoshua Achron. 15) Melamed
Leho’il, siman 68. 16) Aruch HaShulchan, O.C. 362:26.
17) Chavatzelet HaSharon, O.C. 19. 18) Chazon Ish, O.C.
107:5-8 [The Chazon Ish ultimately (see the end of 112:5 in the letters)
cites Rabeinu Yonasan that me’d’Oraysa there is no shiur
pirtzah in a situation of shem daled mechitzos, as well as omed
merubeh]. 19) Achiezer, 4:8. 20) Igros Moshe, O.C.
2:89-90. The above poskim do not make any distinction between mechitzos
consisting of omed merubeh al haparutz or of pasei bira’os.
[20] I can rebut all arguments of
these yungerleit, however, these are complicated sygyos and would
require many pages to disprove them in a lucid fashion. While it is beyond the
scope of this article, I will refute a few of their arguments here, albeit
abstrusely. I believe the following will demonstrate to those who know the inyan
that either they are menuvalim breshus haTorah, or that they simply are am
haratzim.
We contend that when the Bais Ephraim in siman 27
argues that the walls of Yerushalayim were not classified as pasei bira’os
since they were breached in their corners, he was affirming as well that the
walls were parutz merubeh. Hence, the Bais Ephraim was positing
that the situation in Yerushalayim was that both, there was no pasei bira’os
and no omed merubeh al haparutz. However, these yungerleit argue
that the Bais Epharaim cites Tosfos in Bava Metzia who
maintains that there were only a few breaches in the mechitzos in
Yerushalayim, and nevertheless it was classified as a reshus harabbim.
Accordingly, this demonstrates, they argue, that the Bais Epharaim
maintains that in a situation of omed merubeh al haparutz with no pasei
bira’os, pirtzos esser is me’d’Oraysa. Their arguments
demonstrate that they made up their mind and are not interested in the emes.
Clearly the Bais Ephraim is not following Tosfos’ submission
regarding Yerushalayim’s reality. The Bais Ephraim suggested that in
Yerushalayim they rectified the breaches with tzuras hapesachim (which
was sufficient according to the Chachamim to allow carrying for kodashim
but not for Shabbos), while Tosfos clearly is not proposing that they
rectified Yerushalayim with tzuras hapesachim (because Tosfos,
here is following Rav Yehudah). [The Bais Ephraim is countering the Zera
Emes’s argument on the Mishnah Lemelech.] Therefore, since the Bais
Ephriam is not following Tosfos here, he could have posited that
there was no pasei bira’os and no omed merubeh al haparutz in
Yerushalayim, and hence it was classified as a reshus harabbim.
An additional proof that these yungerleit cite to buttress
their argument that the Bais Epharaim maintains in a situation of omed
merubeh of three mechitzos, we say that pirtzos esser is on a
d’Oraysa level, is from his citing on p. 53b (siman 27) of the Ritva.
The Bais Ephraim proposes that when the Ritva suggests (Eruvin
22a) that Yerushalayim was omed merubeh al haparutz (prior to its walls
being breached, and thus it was a reshus hayachid), that its corners
where intact as well. Hence, they argue that the Bais Ephraim must be
adding that the corners where intact because he maintains that only with pasei
bira’os would he allow a pirtzos esser. What they are
misunderstanding is that the Bais Ephraim is only proposing that the
corners where intact with the addition of omed merubeh al haparutz in
Yerushalayim, was because the Ritva states that the mechitzos in
Yerushalayim comprised of more than just pasei bira’os, since it had the
benefit of shem daled mechitzos. Hence, the Bais Ephraim is
positing that according to the Ritva Yerushalayim had the added benefit
of omed merubeh al haparutz with its closed corners to form shem
daled mechitzos. However, the Bais Ephraim is not suggesting that
even though an area [which includes a rabbim] is enclosed by mechitzos
omed merubeh al haparutz, since the mechitzos are lacking pasei
bira’os [closed corners], it is classified as a reshus harabbim.
Furthermore, this entire argument of the yungerleit demonstrates
a lack of understanding of the Bais Ephraim’s proof that all pirtzos
are me’d’rabbanan. It is not possible that the Ritva and the Bais
Ephraim derive from pasei bira’os that pirtzos esser or a pirtzah
more than thirteen and one-third amos is only d’rabbanan,
since only a pirtzah of thirteen and one-third amos is permitted
in a situation of pasei bira’os. Following this, there is no doubt that
the Ritva understood there is no size pirtzah, which negates any
form of a mechitzah me’d’Oraysa. When the Ritva made his
declaration (Eruvin 17b) that there is no size pirtza that would
negate pasei bira’os, he chose a situation of pasei bira’os, and
not of three mechitzos, because he wanted to demonstrate that even
though pasei bira’os are parutz merubeh al haomed they are not
inferior to mechitzos (since the corners are closed). Now that we
recognize that pasei bira’os are not inferior, they are not negated by
any size pirtzah just as we would say with mechitzos, which are omed
merubeh al haparutz.
All the other proofs they cite from the Bais Ephraim
(including the Avnei Nezer) demonstrates either a lack of understanding
of the inayn or a purposeful misconstruing of the subject.
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