Part 22: REBUTTAL TO THE LAWS OF AN ERUV

The Sefer – Page 59 (continued):

If the population of the aforementioned city would be larger, and it would have a population of three million people living in an area approximately 8.5 by 8.5 miles, then Hagaon Rav Moshe Feinstein would consider the entire city a reshus harabim. Rav Moshe terms this concept, where an entire neighborhood, not just a single street, becomes forbidden, as machaneh Yisroel — a Jewish encampment (similar to that of the desert). Within such an area even side streets are forbidden.

Rebuttal: However, it is important to note that while Rav Moshe maintained that if an area of twelve mil by twelve mil contained a population of three million, the entire area is classified as a reshus harabbim; nevertheless, we see that he allowed eruvin for Kew Garden Hills, Queens (Igros Moshe, O.C. 4:86); Oak Park and Southfield, Detroit (ibid., 5:29), and the Jewish quarters in Europe (ibid., 5:28:5). Rav Moshe allowed these city eruvin despite the fact that these cities were part of a twelve mil by twelve mil area, which Rav Moshe considered a possible reshus harabbim. The reason Rav Moshe allowed for a neighborhood of these large cities to be demarcated with a tzuras hapesach was because it encompassed less than shishim ribo. In his teshuvah regarding Detroit, Michigan, the Debrecener rav (Kenesses Yecheskel, vol. 1, 2009) stated that he understood that Rav Moshe’s shita was that one can demarcate a neighborhood from a large contiguous built up city even though it’s under the rubric of a metropolis. [On the other hand, regarding Boro Park and Flatbush, Rav Moshe was led to believe that they independently contained populations greater than shishim ribo; therefore, he argued that a tzuras hapesach could not demarcate these Brooklyn neighborhoods (Igros Moshe, O.C. 5:28:5 and Addendum to O.C. 4:89).]

Lest one think that a tzuras hapesach could not demarcate a reshus harabbim, I would note that there are Rishonim and Achronim who maintain that it is sufficient if a tzuras hapesach encompasses less than shishim ribo (see Tosfos Rid, Eruvin 22a; Or Zarua, Eruvin 22a; Rav Yonasan Stief zt”l in Mahari Stief, siman 68; Rav Chaim Michoel Dov Weissmandel zt”l in Toras Chemed, p. 93, and Rav Elya Meir Bloch zt”l in Kol Tzvi number 7).

Consequentially, Rav Moshe would allow almost all city eruvin as long as the tzuras hapesachim did not include a population of shishim ribo.

The Sefer – Page 59 (continued):

Main roads and side streets

As mentioned previously, in the times of Chazal, cities were typically comprised of alleyways and a single main road. At present, cities consist of a complex grid of side streets and main streets; it is important to determine which current day streets are comparable to the reshus harabim of ancient times.

Rebuttal: The answer is none. As I mentioned previously, since the populace of today’s cities utilizes many thoroughfares, none of the streets are traversed by its entire population. Consequentially, even if a city today contains a population of shishim ribo, no street would be classified as a reshus harabbim since they are not traversed by the city’s entire population.

 

The Sefer – Page 59 (continued):

According to the Rishonim mentioned earlier that do not require shishim ribo, the Poskim agree that it is prohibited to enclose even the side streets of such a city if they have a width of sixteen amos.

Rebuttal: Yet again I must state that we do not pasken like these Rishonim. Furthermore, there are additional factors that would allow eruvin in most of our cities, even according to these Rishonim, such as mefulash u’mechavanim m’shaar l’shaar and mechitzos. 

 

The Sefer – Page 59 (continued):

Contemporary side streets are not similar to the muvaos of the time of Chazal. The muvaos are private property, which belonged to the residents of the mavoi. By contrast our streets are public property and serve as an auxiliary to the main streets.(48) 

Footnote 48:

כך שמענו מהגר״ש מילער והגר״מ ברלין ועוד כמה פוסקים והטעם דלא דמי למבואות שבזמן התלמוד דבאמת היה שייך רק לבני המבוי.

Rebuttal: But Rav Shlomo Miller shlita (see footnote 39) maintains that we follow the Rishonim who uphold the criterion of shishim ribo. So why are the authors even mentioning this issue in the name of this posek here?

 

The Sefer – Footnote 48 (continued):

ויותר מזה שמענו מכמה תלמידים דלדעת הגר״מ פיינשטיין זצ״ל בעיר שיש לו דין מחנה ישראל (כמו שבארנו בפנים) כל הרחובות ואף רחוב ללא מוצא (dead-end street) דינו כרשות הרבים. וטעמו משום דלא דמי למבואות שבימי חז״ל שלא היה שייך כל כך לרבים, אבל הרחובות שלנו שייכי ממש לרבים והוה כקרן זוית דאי לאו דלא ניחא תשמישתיה נחשב כרשות הרבים עצמו.

Rebuttal: The above is total fiction, and there is no way that Rav Moshe would have said this. You see, dear reader, these arguments are made by people who are simply trying to fit Rav Moshe into their own agenda but do not know hilchos eruvin very well, which proves their undoing in the end. The argument that a dead-end street could be halachically categorized as a functional keren zavis, which is classified as a reshus harabbim, is total am haratzus. The Rambam (Shabbos 14:4) explicitly states that a keren zavis in three mechitzos is classified as a karmelis. Consequentially, since all dead-end streets are inherently enclosed with three mechitzos, if we would seal the fourth side with a tzuras hapesach, it would be classified as a reshus hayachid l’chol hadeios [just as a house situated in the twelve mil by twelve mil area is classified as a reshus hayachid]. Therefore, there is no doubt that Rav Moshe would not have said that a dead-end street cannot be demarcated. 

In any case, Rav Moshe should not be included in this footnote. Rav Moshe maintained that, without a doubt, we rely on the criterion of shishim ribo (Igros Moshe, O.C. 5:24:10, and see also 3:94:3; 5:19).

Furthermore, this entire argument regarding the difference between the public’s rights to the mavo’os in the time of Chazal and their rights today is spurious.  In fact, local community members [as opposed to the general public] currently do maintain jurisdiction over their thoroughfares regarding many matters. It is important to note that the Avnei Nezer (O.C. 273:5) declared, regarding this matter, that one should not make this distinction as there was no difference between Chazal’s era and today.